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a b s t r a c t
The accelerating accumulation and risk concentration of Chinese local financing platforms
debts have attracted wide attention throughout the world. Due to the network of financial
exposures among institutions, the failure of several platforms or regions of systemic
importance will probably trigger systemic risk and destabilize the financial system.
However, the complex network of credit relationships in Chinese local financing platforms
at the state level remains unknown. To fill this gap, we presented the first complex
networks and hierarchical cluster analysis of the credit market of Chinese local financing
platforms using the ‘‘bottom up’’ method from firm-level data. Based on balance-sheet
channel, we analyzed the topology and taxonomy by applying the analysis paradigm of
subdominant ultra-metric space to an empirical data in 2013. It is remarked that we
chose to extract the network of co-financed financing platforms in order to evaluate the
effect of risk contagion from platforms to bank system. We used the new credit similarity
measure by combining the factor of connectivity and size, to extract minimal spanning
trees (MSTs) and hierarchical trees (HTs). We found that: (1) the degree distributions of
credit correlation backbone structure of Chinese local financing platforms are fat tailed,
and the structure is unstable with respect to targeted failures; (2) the backbone is highly
hierarchical, and largely explained by the geographic region; (3) the credit correlation
backbone structure based on connectivity and size is significantly heterogeneous; (4) key
platforms and regions of systemic importance, and contagion path of systemic risk are
obtained, which are contributed to preventing systemic risk and regional risk of Chinese
local financing platforms and preserving financial stability under the framework of macro
✩ This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71473179) and Peking University-Lincoln Institute Fund
(Grant No. DS10-20150901-CX).∗ Corresponding author at: 1211 Tongji Building A, Siping Road 1500, Shanghai 200092, China.
E-mail address: chenxi4731@sina.com (X. Chen).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2016.05.032
0378-4371/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
F. He, X. Chen / Physica A 461 (2016) 158–170 159
prudential supervision. Our approach of credit similarity measure provides a means of
recognizing ‘‘systemically important’’ institutions and regions for a targeted policy with
risk minimization which gives a flexible and comprehensive consideration to both aspects
of ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central to fail’’.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The recent economic crisis, which began with the burst of the housing market bubble in the US, has highlighted the
networked structure of the economic world [1–3]. The land market bears close relationships with the financial system
and plays a crucial role in economies, hence, the collapse of a real-estate bubble usually exerts disastrous consequences
of financial crisis and economic recession. As it is increasingly accepted that financial networks play an important role in
stability properties of the financial system [4–12], there has beenmuch focus on how network theory can be used to explain
financial markets, and better understand and quantify systemic risk of the economic and financial system [13–20]. Due to
strong connectivity, catastrophic cascading failure of nodes in networks can happen in case of system shock, especiallywhen
shocked nodes represent hubs, or have high centrality measures in the network [21–23]. Scholars have paid main attention
on the determination of the so-called ‘‘systemically important’’ financial institutions for discussions of systemic risk, thus
leading to the significant question: whether institutions are of systemic importance because they are ‘‘too big to fail’’ or ‘‘too
central to fail’’ [24], onwhich universal agreement has not been reached [7,25,26]. In credit networks describing the complex
credit relation between firms and banks, hierarchical methods have been used to detect the backbone of the networked
structure and identify institutions of systemic importance [27,28]. However, research achievement on hierarchical structure
of credit networks has been limited to the perspective of ‘‘too central to fail’’ due to the correlationmeasure only considering
the connectivity from banks to firms [29].
Recently, the accelerating accumulation and risk concentration of Chinese local financing platforms debts have attracted
wide attention throughout the world. Preventing systemic risk and regional risk of Chinese local financing platforms and
preserving financial stability is therefore one of the priorities of regulators and central banks in China. It is widely accepted
that there is overreliance of financing platforms on land financing; the uncertainty of land income, however, will exert credit
risk to local financing platforms [30–32]. With the slowdown of China’s economic growth, a crash of the land market will
probably induce systemic risk in the local financing platforms, endangering the quality of bank credit assets and the security
of financial system [32,33]. In fact, the stability of the financing platforms is strongly related to the underlying structure
of credit relationships among its components [34–36]. The failure of a big firm may lead risk contagion occur as a domino
effect, and an example of such scenario happened in Japan during the 1990s. The empirical study of the Japan credit network
showed that both the degree distributions of firms and banks follow a power law and the hubs are banks, which occupy the
central positions in the network [28]. Same conclusion was also drawn from the empirical study of Italy case [27]. Based on
the empirical study of the Japan and Italy cases, authors held that the topology of the credit network plays a crucial role in
bankruptcy diffusion and that complex credit relationships could possibly trigger the financial systemic risk [27,28,37].
While networks have been widely used to model the interactions among financial institutions, recent progress has been
achieved in the research on the correlation based networks. Correlation-based network analysis can reduce complexity of
financial dependencies and extract themost important information in the system, which is conducive to understanding and
forecasting the dynamics in financial markets [38,39]. There are differentmethods to construct correlation-based networks;
concerning hierarchical methods, Mantegna [40,41] was one of the first to apply the analysis paradigm of subdominant
ultra-metric space to financial markets, and introduced a method for finding a hierarchical arrangement for a portfolio of
stocks by extracting the minimum spanning tree (MST) from the complete network of correlations of daily closing price
returns for US stocks. This type of analysis has been performed afterwards in many different markets, time periods, and
market conditions [42–46]. Scholars applied Mantegna’s method to the field of the bank–firm credit relationships and have
successively analyzed the credit networks of Italy and Japan based on the connectivity from banks to firms [27,28]. Although
great attention has been paid to the architecture of credit relationships in Italy and Japan, the complex network of credit
relationships in Chinese local financing platforms remains unknown, which makes it difficult for scholars to further explore
the systemic risk of local financing platforms. Liu et al. [47] hold that the correlated risk is the latest and the most typical
characterization of credit risk in China, but most studies on risks of local financing platforms are not conducted from the
perspective of correlated credit risk.
It has been found that correlated credit risk shows a strong geographical characterization. De Masi et al. [28] analyzed
Japanese credit relationships based on the network of between firms and banks in 2004 and found that theminimal spanning
trees disclose a highly hierarchical backbone and demonstrated a strong geographical characterization. Geographical
clusters can be also identified in the Italian market: De Masi and Gallegati [27,37] found that heterogeneity appears among
co-financing banks, small banks exert great exposure to risk to the bankruptcy of large banks, and the systemic risk is more
probable to happen on a regional scale because of the geographical nature of MST. In China, Ba et al. [48,49] hold that four
types of local risks exist in the debts of local financing platforms in terms of regions, and regional concentration risk is the
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key factor of credit risk management and supervision. Abundant literatures on the local financing platforms are available
using qualitative analysis but void using quantitative methods from the regional perspective.
Note that the choice of the similarity measure for correlation-based networks is arbitrary [38]. Mantegna chose to use
the linear correlation as a measure of similarity for a stock market. Later, De Masi analyzed a credit market based on the
similarity measure of the number of loan contracts. However, Yoshi Fujiwara [29] held that De Masi et al. [28] show the
minimum spanning tree (MST) calculated by a similarity measure ignoring the information of weight (i.e. loan amount).
IMF & BIS & FSB [50] held that systemically important institutions are firms of which disorderly failure are due to their
size, complexity, and systemic interconnectedness. Thus, it is of great significance to take a step further by giving the credit
similarity measure with the information of both size and connectivity. Further, it is extremely important for regulators to
have a comprehensive understanding on ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central to fail’’ when they make policies.
Although the importance and urgency of Chinese local financing platforms risk problems are increasing day by day, the
data is comparatively limited. This has limited current research to just focus on the overall debt scale [49,51–53]. Considering
that financial risks often accumulate and diffuse from below, it is difficult to reveal the complexity of financial system as the
overall data could possibly conceal the real systemic risk. Zhang et al. [54] is one of the few who analyze the financial risk
of financing platforms using the ‘‘bottom up’’ method from firm-level data in China, but he did not explore the correlated
credit risk of financing platforms on the basis of network theory.
In this paper, we construct the loan database of Chinese local financing platforms based on the information disclosures at
the public bond issuances and annual reports of financing platforms. This paper is to investigate the topology and taxonomy
of the credit relationships by applying the analysis paradigm of subdominant ultra-metric space to an empirical data of
Chinese local financingplatforms in 2013.We focus on the systemic risk and regional risk of Chinese local financingplatforms
by using the ‘‘bottom up’’ method from firm-level data. It is remarked that we chose to extract the network of co-financed
financing platforms in order to evaluate the effect of risk contagion from platforms to bank system. In order to illustrate and
identify the systemically important financing platforms and regions better, we consider the factor of both size and systemic
interconnectedness when define the similarity distance by using the concept of theMST and HT, and identify contagion path
of systemic risk. To give reference to regulators for a comprehensive understanding on a targeted policy from the perspective
of ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central to fail’’, we present and compare theMSTs and HTs based on different credit correlations.
Therefore, the study is significant for preventing financial systemic risks and strengthening recognition, supervision and
salvation of the crucial financing platforms and regions for policy makers and related organizations under the framework of
macro prudential supervision.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains themethodology, namely, the new credit similarity
measure proposed in this paper, credit correlation based network representation and the property measure of MSTs and
HTs. Section 3 shows the data, including data collection and the database we have established. In Section 4, we present the
empirical results and numerical comparison, and conduct a further discussion. Finally, Section 5 draws the conclusion.
2. Methodology
We focus on the problem of the Chinese local financing platform system of credit relationships, defining the concept of
credit network using an approach based on the graph theory [55]. Interactions among financing platforms and banks are
quantified by the correlation matrix, which is very important for the practical problem of minimization of risk. In our case,
the interaction is a credit relation. We represent the bipartite network with nodes representing the financing platforms
and banks, and edges representing credit relationships among them. In order to evaluate the effect of risk contagion from
platforms to bank system, we extract the network of the co-financed financing platforms from the bipartite network with
themethod of projected network.When applying themethod ofMST andHT,many previous studies focused on a correlation
measure ignoring the information of size [27,28]. Our model takes these studies an important step further by combining the
information of connectivity and size.
2.1. Determination of the credit similarity measure
In 1999, it was proposed to use the distance di,j =

2

1− ρi,j

, whereρi,j is the correlation coefficient, for the analysis of
the hierarchical structure of a stockmarket [42]. Later on, the distance di,j =

2

1− ωi,j

was used to analyze a credit mar-
ket, whereωi,j is based on the number of contracts frombanks to firmswithout considering the effect of loan amount [27,28].
In order to distinguish the effects of connectivity and size for systemic risk, we defined two types of credit distance: the
distance only including the information of the number of loan contracts (di,j of Eq. (1)) and the distance only including
the information of loan amount (d′i,j of Eq. (2)). It is worth to notice that the debt and the size (asset) of the firm are
highly correlated [28,56], and the linear correlation coefficient in our case is 0.89. Further, the information of loan amount
represents the credit similarity of local financing platforms better. Thus, we choose to use loan amount tomeasure the effect
of size for systemic risk. We finally defined the credit similarity distance considering the effects of both connectivity and
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size (Di,j of Eq. (3)) by introducing the parameter α. Obviously, the credit distance Di,j fulfills axioms of metric distance1.
di,j =

2

1− ω′i,j

, ω′i,j = ωi,j/ωmax (1)
where ωi,j represents the number of contracts from banks to local financing platforms.
d′i,j =

2

1− ϕ′i,j

, ϕ′i,j =

k

Pik
Pi
· Pjk
Pj

(2)
where Pi represents the sum of loans of financing platform i holds to all banks in the credit network, Pik represents the loan
amount bank k gives to financing platform i.
Di,j = α · di,j + (1− α) · d′i,j (3)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
2.2. Network representation using hierarchical methods
Wecreate the credit correlationnetwork bymethodofMST andHTbasedon the credit similarity distance discussed in 2.1.
2.2.1. Minimal spanning tree (MST)
One of the most common algorithms to detect a possible hierarchical structure hidden in the data is given by the MST
procedure [38]. In order to identify the backbone of the credit risk contagion channel of Chinese financing platforms, we
focus on the most important links in the projected network. We analyze a tree with only N − 1 links, which select the most
information of the credit matrix. The algorithm used to construct the tree of financing platforms is the MST.
We use the metric distance Di,j defined in Eq. (3) to construct the MST. Various algorithms have been proposed to
construct a MST such as Kruskal [57] and Prim [58]. In our paper, the Kruskal’s algorithm [57] is applied.
2.2.2. Hierarchical tree (HT)
In addition to the MSTs, we construct a hierarchical tree (HT) to further detect the taxonomy of relationships between
financing platforms. The MST is strongly related with a well-known hierarchical clustering algorithm called Single Linkage
Cluster Analysis [38]. TheMST provides the information needed for calculating the subdominant ultrametric distancematrix
d∧, which is obtained by defining the distance d∧i,j between i and j as themaximum of any Euclidean distance dk,l determined
by moving in single steps from i to j through the shortest path connecting i and j in the MST [40,41]. The hierarchical tree
ranks the linkages between financing platforms via the subdominant ultrametric distance, beginningwith the pair exhibiting
the shortest distance measure. Thus, the last financing platforms added to the hierarchical tree are those with the most
distant linkages to the core financing platforms.
2.3. The property measure of MSTs and HTs
We use the property measure to compare the MSTs and HTs conducted by different credit correlations. This allows us
to compare the effects of connectivity and size on systemic risk from the perspective of ‘‘too central to fail’’ and ‘‘too big to
fail’’.
The normalized tree length (NTL), which measures the closeness among the components of network, is defined in
Eq. (4) [59,60].
LNTL =

Dij∈Θ
Dij
 / (N − 1) (4)
whereΘ is the set of edges, and N − 1 denotes the number of edges present in the MST.
Building upon the normalized tree length concept, we characterize the strength of clusters in a similar manner by the
normalized cluster length (NCL), defined for a cluster c in Eq. (5).
LNCL =

Dij∈c
Dij
 /Nc (5)
How compact the structure of a network is can be measured by the characteristic path length (CPL), which is used to
quantify the average minimal route between pairs of nodes. It is defined in Eq. (6) [61].
1 di,j = 0, if and only if i = j; di,j = dj,i; di,j ≤ di,k + dk,j .
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LCPL =

i,j:j≠j
lij

/N (N − 1) (6)
where lij is the number of edges in the shortest path between nodes i and j [62].
The measure LNLN is defined as the number of non-leaf nodes (NLN), which is used to measure the loose degree of the
MST. The larger the value, the looser the MST is.
The cophenetic correlation coefficient (CCC) is defined in Eq. (7) [63,64], whichmeasures the correlation between the HT
and the MST.
CCC =

i<j

dij − d
× cij − c

i<j

dij − d
2
i<j

cij − c
2 (7)
where dij and d are the element and the average element of the distance matrix; cij and c are the elements and the average
elements of the cophenetic matrix, respectively.
3. Data
We establish the loan database of Chinese local financing platforms mainly based on the information disclosures at the
public bond issuances. This dataset is more extended than others studied in the literature because of the firm-level data of
Chinese local financing platforms. We thus know the identity of platforms financed by each bank. This allows us to use the
‘‘bottom up’’ method to study how the topology and taxonomy of the credit network affect the likelihood of a financial crisis.
Our database is based on the data collection from the bond prospectus and annual reports, and balance sheets of financing
platforms. Data of bond prospectus and annual reports were provided from China Foreign Exchange Trade System and
National Interbank Funding Center available online (http://www.chinamoney.com.cn). The financial statements and surveys
include the information about each firm’s borrowing from financial institutions, the amounts of borrowing.
After data preprocessing of eliminating the financing platforms with no credit information or loan balance, and no
explicit creditor information, we focus on 2786 credit relationships of 301 financing platforms with 221 banks in the year
2013. Samples of financial platforms cover 29 regions according to Chinese provincial administration region. The dataset
contains information on each platform’s characteristics (total net worth, total asset, credit risk exposure to each bank). The
301 financing platforms included in the study and their respective symbols and regions are given in Appendix A. We will
construct the MSTs and HTs from these data in the next section.
4. Results
In this section, we firstly analyze the bipartite network. Further, we investigate theMSTs and HTs of co-financed network
of Chinese local financing platforms in order to identify the systemically important financing platforms and regions, and
contagion path of systemic risk. Finally, we compare the MSTs and HTs based on different credit distance, and discuss the
problems of systemic risk and regional risk from the perspective of ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central to fail’’.
4.1. The Firms–Banks credit network
In the network of financing platforms and banks, the average strength (i.e. loan amount) of platforms is 1.1×104 million
CNY. The linear correlation coefficient between the number of loan contracts and loan amount of platforms is 0.34, indicating
the presence of a weak link between the amount of credit platforms demand the banks for and the number of banks they
ask to.
We examined the degree and strength distribution of Chinese local financing platforms by applying themethod of Alstott
et al. [65]. The strength distribution follows a power-law, i.e., P (k) ∼ k−γ . The estimated parameter is 2.77, indicating a
heterogeneous behavior of local financing platforms on the amount of credit. However, the estimated parameter of degree
distribution is 4.9, indicating a homogeneous behavior on the number of banks they ask to.
4.2. The MSTs of co-financed financing platforms network
We used the MST to extract backbone of risk contagion channel from co-financed financing platform network. The
average degree of the MST is close to 2.
As space is limited, we choose to present three most significant MSTs with the credit similarity distance in Eq. (3) by
only including the information of connectivity (α = 1), only including the information of size (α = 0), and including the
effects of both connectivity and size with equal weight (α = 0.5). We examined the degree distribution of the MSTs by
applying the method of Alstott et al. [65]. When α = 1, the degree distribution of the MST follows a power-law and the
power exponent is 2.36, indicating that hubs exist in the network. As scale-free networks would be fragile under targeted
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Table 1
Local financing platforms, regions and their corresponding codes and symbols.
Code Symbol Local financing platforms Region
2 BEIH Beijing Energy Investment Holding Co., Ltd. Beijing
16 TMIC Tianjin Municipal Investment Co., Ltd. Tianjin
23 TBSAA Tianjin Bohai State-owned Assets Administration Co., Ltd. Tianjin
27 SMIC Shanghai Municipal Investment (Group) Corporation Shanghai
36 SJHC Shanghai Jiading Highway Construction Co., Ltd. Shanghai
37 SPDG Shanghai Pudong Development Group Shanghai
44 CRTC Chongqing Rail Transit (Group) Co., Ltd. Chongqing
45 CCTDI Chongqing Urban Transportation Development & Investment Group Co., Ltd. Chongqing
55 HXIAI Heibei Xuanhua Industrial Area Investment Co., Ltd. Hebei
76 YKPG Ying Kou Port Group Co., Ltd. Liaoning
81 HIGC Harbin Investment Group Co., Ltd. Heilongjiang
84 AEHG Anhui Expressway Holding Group Co., Ltd. Anhui
106 XMIG Xiamen Iport Group Fujian
107 XMCD Xiamen C&D Co., Ltd. Fujian
108 XMWC Xiamen Water Co., Ltd. Fujian
120 CUCID Changsha Urban Construction Investment & Development Group Co., Ltd. Hunan
133 LAID Loudi Antimony Investment & Development Co., Ltd. Hunan
135 JSCH JiangSu Communications Holding Co., Ltd. Jiangsu
137 NUCIH Nanjing Urban Construction Investment Holding (Group) Co., Ltd. Jiangsu
139 NNIIG Nanjing new industrial investment Group Co., Ltd. Jiangsu
141 NTCID Nanjing Tangshan Construction Investment & Development Co., Ltd. Jiangsu
143 WCCD Wuxi Xidong Construction Development Co., Ltd. Jiangsu
149 CUCC Changzhou Urban Construction (Group) Co., Ltd. Jiangsu
167 SXWT Shaoxing Water Treatment Co., Ltd. Zhejiang
195 RZPC Rizhao Port Co., Ltd. Shandong
205 SHIM Sichuan Hydropower Investment and Management Group Ltd. Sichuan
206 SEIIG Sichuan Energy Industry Investment Group Co., Ltd. Sichuan
244 TSADO Turpan State-owned Assets Development and Operation Co., Ltd. Xinjiang
245 APGID Aksu Prefecture Green Industry Development Co., Ltd. Xinjiang
250 NLCIG Nanning Lvgang Construction Investment Group Co., Ltd. Guangxi
252 HUCID Hezhou Urban Construction Investment and Development Co., Ltd. Guangxi
255 FICDI Fangchenggang Ganggong Infrastructure Construction Development and Investment Co., Ltd. Guangxi
256 QREDG Qionzhou Binhai Real Estate and Development Group Co., Ltd. Guangxi
272 GPCG Guangdong Provincial Communications Group Co., Ltd. Guangdong
276 GGAMC Guangdong Guangye Assets Management Co., Ltd. Guangdong
284 GCCIG Guangzhou City Construction Investment Group Guangdong
failures, the hubs are too important for the system to fail [66–68]. When α = 0, the degree distribution is also fat tailed, and
the power exponent is 2.59. However, when α = 0.5 the tail turns into a relatively divergent one, and the power exponent
is 3.97. The change demonstrates that some financing platforms are more correlative while the others are not.
Figures 1a–1c show the MST of co-financed relationships of Chinese local financing platforms in the year 2013 with
different values ofα in Eq. (3), 1, 0 and 0.5 respectively. As space is limited, we only present the information of local financing
platforms which we will discuss in this section, shown in Table 1.
We analyze the regulatory focus of ‘‘too central to fail’’ policy by Fig. 1a. By looking at theMST based on credit similarity in
Fig. 1a,we observe that the backbone of co-financed relationships of Chinese local financing platforms is composedby groups
which correspond to branches of the tree, and the MST is star-like. The central positions of the highly hierarchical backbone
are occupied by BEIH, JSCH, NUCIH, TBSAA, SMIC, XMCD and YKPG, which may become a core channel of risk contagion.
The MST enables us to identify possible contagion pathways that a central bank can exploit to minimize the cascade effects,
reduce the associated costs of a banking crisis and hence the costs of systemic shocks through the supervisory control of a
central bank and the swift and accurate intervention to the troubled institutions [25].
The hubs are BEIH, YKPG and SMIC according to degree centrality. The ‘‘star-like’’ MST and the existence of hubs indicate
an unstable credit market state. A crash of the land market will probably exert credit risk to local financing platforms. The
failure and thus insolvency of a big financing platform, having strong effects on the balance sheet of a bank, may lead many
banks to fail or change their credit policy, either by increasing the interest rates or by reducing the supply of loans, which,
in turn, may cause other financing platforms’ failure, therefore, create more financial distress among banks and so on, in a
sort of domino effect affecting the whole system [38]. Thus, BEIH, YKPG and SMIC are the systemically important financing
platforms under the policy of ‘‘too central to fail’’.
Further, the cluster structure of the network is mainly explained by the geographic region. In this figure, we detected
18 different regional clusters according to Chinese provincial level administration regionalization. Moreover, 11 provinces
were not able to form a cluster. The cluster of Jiangsu Province forms the central structure, and JSCH and NUCIH are the
central nodes. A center of second cluster, belongs to Tianjinwith TBSAA and TMIC at the central.Moreover, Anhui, Chongqing
and Sichuan also form obvious regional clusters, with AEHG, CCTDI, SHIM the predominant company, respectively. As the
164 F. He, X. Chen / Physica A 461 (2016) 158–170
Fig. 1a. Minimal spanning tree for year 2013 with 301 financing platforms when the value of α in Eq. (3) is 1: the colors indicate the geographical regions
according to Chinese provincial level administration regionalization. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
systemic risk is more probable to happen on a regional scale because of the geographical nature of MST [27,28,37], these
regions are of systemic importance for Chinese local financing platforms. Hence, Jiangsu, Tianjin, Anhui, Chongqing and
Sichuan are the key regions under the policy of ‘‘too central to fail’’.
We analyze the regulatory focus of ‘‘too big to fail’’ policy by Fig. 1b. Note that there are significant differences on central
nodes and hubs of the MST in Fig. 1b. The MST is more compacted and superstar-like. The central positions of the backbone
are occupied by CRTC, HUCID, LAID, HXIAI, FICDI, XMWC, XMIG, RZPC and SXWT, and the channel between these financing
platforms may become the contagion path of systemic risk. Further, the superstar-like hubs are CRTC, XMWC and SXWT,
indicating an extremely unstable credit market state. In this figure, we detected 10 different regional clusters, showing
significant decline in the cluster numbers comparedwith that in Fig. 1a, and 19 provinceswere not able to form a cluster.We
observe that the cluster of Chongqing forms the central structure and CRTC is the predominant company. Another obvious
regional cluster is Zhejiang, with SXWT at the central. Moreover, Jiangsu and Sichuan also form obvious regional clusters.
Hence, Chongqing, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Sichuan are the key regions under the policy of ‘‘too big to fail’’.
We analyze the regulatory focus of ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central to fail’’ policies with equal weight by Fig. 1c. As
shown in Fig. 1c, the MST is more chainlike. The chainlike structure can be characterized as ‘‘center–periphery’’ division
according to distances of the MST. Although the tail of degree distribution turns into a divergent one, we can still identify
the systemically important financing platforms and regions based on the ‘‘center–periphery’’ structure. CRTC, HIGC, CUCID,
CUCC, NUCIH, SMIC, GGAMC and XMCD are at the center of the network. In this figure, we detected 21 different regional
clusters and 8 provinces were not able to form a cluster. We observe that the cluster of Jiangsu forms the central structure
and NUCIH is the predominant company. A center of second cluster, belongs to Guangdong with GGAMC at the central.
Moreover, Chongqing, Anhui and Sichuan also form obvious regional clusters, with CCTDI, AEHG and SHIM the predominant
companies, respectively. Thus, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Chongqing, Anhui and Sichuan are the key regions when regulators take
the policies of ‘‘too central to fail’’ and ‘‘too big to fail’’ with equal weight.
4.3. The HTs of co-financed financing platforms network
In addition, we also present the hierarchical trees (HTs) of the subdominant ultrametric space associated with the MSTs
in Figs. 2a–2c. The height of the horizontal line in Fig. 2 indicates the ultrametric distance at which the two platforms are
joined.
In Fig. 2a, we observed three different clusters. The first cluster is the Sichuan cluster, which consists of SHIM and SEIIG
with the distance 1.128, indicating the highest similarity. The second cluster is Jiangsu, consisting of NTCID andWCCD. The
third cluster is Guangxi, which consists of NLCIG and QREDG.
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Fig. 1b. The same as Fig. 1a, except for α = 0. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
Table 2
The property measure of MSTs and HTs for different values of α in Eq. (3).
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1
Normalized tree length 1.1030 1.1396 1.0770
Characteristic path length 6.4572 7.8092 5.5238
Number of non-leaf nodes 42 95 51
Cophenetic correlation coefficient 0.3465 0.3764 0.4671
In Fig. 2b,we detected three different clusters. The first cluster is the same as in Fig. 2a, but the distance is 0.316,much less
than that in Fig. 2a. The second cluster is Jiangsu, composed of JSCH, NUCIH, NNIIG and CUCC. The third cluster is Xinjiang,
composed of TSADO and APGID.
In Fig. 2c, we detected five different clusters, more than that in two other scenarios. The first cluster is Jiangsu, in which
the distance between NUCIH and CUCC is the smallest, namely 0.644. The second cluster is Sichuan composed of SHIM
and SEIIG. Moreover, we detected a different cluster, Guangdong, composed of GPCG and GCCIG. SJHC and SPDG form the
Shanghai cluster. Guangxi is the fifth cluster composed of NLCIG and QREDG.
4.4. The property measure and numerical comparison
In order to compare the systemically important financing platforms and regions under the policies of ‘‘too big to fail’’ and
‘‘too central to fail’’, we conduct numerical comparisons of MSTs and HTs properties, shown in Table 2.
As shown in Table 2, we observe an obvious increase of normalized tree length and characteristic path length when
α = 0.5, indicating that the MST become more loose when we combine the information of connectivity and size. The same
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Fig. 1c. The same as Fig. 1a, except for α = 0.5. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
Fig. 2a. The hierarchical tree corresponding to theMST for year 2013with 301 financing platformswhen the value ofα in Eq. (3) is 1. The colors indicate the
geographical regions according to Chinese provincial level administration regionalization. Y axis represents ultrametric distance between two financing
platforms. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
conclusion can be drawn by observing the changes in the number of non-leaf nodes when α = 0.5. As discussed before, by
looking at the linear correlation coefficient between the number of loan contracts and loan amount, the degree and strength
distribution of bipartite network, the degree distribution of MSTs with the value of α in Eq. (3) is 0, 0.5 and 1, and significant
differences on structures and property measures of the MSTs and HTs with different α values, we can conclude that the
credit correlation backbone structure based on connectivity and size of Chinese local financing platforms is significantly
heterogeneous. Hence, the key points of supervision, i.e. the systemically important financing platforms and regions, should
be changeable when regulators and central banks focus the policies of ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central to fail’’ differently.
Note that there is a significant increase on cophenetic correlation coefficient when α = 1, demonstrating the hierarchy
increase. Moreover, we found that normalized tree length and characteristic path length are the lowest when α = 1,
indicating that correlation of financing platforms are the highest. Thus, the factor of connectivity is relativelymore important
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Fig. 2b. The same as Fig. 2a, except for α = 0. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
Fig. 2c. The same as Fig. 2a, except for α = 0.5. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
than size on credit similarity in Chinese local financing platforms. This is consistent with Chan [69], Drehmann and
Tarashev [70] on the discussion of systemic importance.
When α = 0, the number of non-leaf nodes is the smallest, but normalized tree length and characteristic path length
are still bigger than those in α = 1. In fact, whether institutions are of systemic importance because they are ‘‘too big
to fail’’ or ‘‘too central to fail’’, on which there has not been consistent opinions. Some authors suggest that too-big-to-fail
institutions should include the evenmore serious issue of too-central-to-fail [7,25,69–71]; however, some authors hold that
the failure of large institutions hasmore effect for networks with high average degree [26]. Networkmodel is only amethod
for the illustration of real cases; moreover, among such researches there has not been universal agreement on the risk
contagion mechanisms. As the similarity measure for correlation-based networks is arbitrary, and that influencing factors
of systemically important institutions should contain both size and interconnectedness [50], it is of great significance for
regulators and risk management practitioners to have a comprehensive understanding on ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central
to fail’’ when they make policies.
Moreover, we compared normalized cluster length (LNCL) with normalized tree length (LNTL) in each case. When α = 0,
Hebei companies form the most tightly packed cluster resulting in LNCL = 0.8871, followed by the Fujian cluster with
LNCL = 0.9716. When α = 1, Guangdong companies form the most tightly packed cluster resulting in LNCL = 0.7071, the
minimum in three scenarios. When α = 0.5, Jiangsu companies form the most tightly packed cluster with LNCL = 1.0162,
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the maximum in three scenarios. It is notable that the Jiangsu cluster forms just the central structure of the MST in Fig. 1c.
Thus, Jiangsu is the key regulatory region.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first complex networks and hierarchical cluster analysis of the credit market of Chinese
local financing platforms at the state level using the ‘‘bottom up’’ method from firm-level data. Based on balance-sheet
channel, we have analyzed the topology and taxonomy of Chinese local financing platforms by applying the analysis
paradigm of subdominant ultra-metric space to an empirical data in 2013. We chose to extract the network of co-financed
financing platforms in order to evaluate the effect of risk contagion from platforms to bank system. Moreover, we have
compared the backbone of risk contagion channel of credit based on different credit correlations, and discussed the systemic
risk and regional risk of Chinese local financing platforms. The main findings of this research are as follows:
(1) Degree distributions of credit correlation backbone structure of Chinese local financing platforms are fat tailed,
indicating a scale-free behavior, which is unstable with respect to targeted failures. Thus, a targeted policy aimed
at reinforcing the stability of systemically important financing platforms, i.e. several hubs in the network, is of great
significance to prevent systemic risk of Chinese local financing platforms.
(2) The structure of credit channel discloses a highly hierarchical backbone fromevidence of hierarchical trees. Furthermore,
the hierarchical structure of the Chinese local financing platforms network is largely explained by the geographic region,
namely, platforms in the same region tend to ask for loans from the samebanks. Thepresence of geographical clusters can
also be found in the Italian and Japanese market [27,28]. Hence, systemic risk is more probable to happen on a regional
scale because of the geographical nature of the MSTs [27,28,37]. It is important for regulators and risk management
practitioners to make a targeted policy for reinforcing the stability of several regions of systemic importance.
(3) Our approach of credit similarity measure provides a means of recognizing ‘‘systemically important’’ institutions and
regions, for a targeted policy with risk minimization which gives a flexible and comprehensive consideration to both
aspects of ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central to fail’’ under the framework of macro prudential supervision. As the
credit correlation backbone structure based on connectivity and size of Chinese local financing platforms is significantly
heterogeneous, key points of supervision should be changeable when regulators and central banks focus differently on
the policies of ‘‘too big to fail’’ and ‘‘too central to fail’’.
(4) In summary, we present the most ‘‘systemically important’’ institutions and regions of the Chinese local financing
platforms system: The too-central-to-fail platforms are BEIH, YKPG, SMIC, TBSAA and NUCIH, yet too-big-to-fail
platforms are CRTC, XMWC, SXWT and HXIAI; when a targeted policy considering effects of connectivity and size with
equal weight, the systemically important platforms are HIGC, CRTC, HXIAI, NUCIH, SMIC and SHIM. Jiangsu, Tianjin,
Anhui, Chongqing and Sichuan are the key regions under the policy of ‘‘too central to fail’’; Chongqing, Zhejiang and
Sichuan are the key regions under the policy of ‘‘too big to fail’’; when regulators take the policies of ‘‘too central to fail’’
and ‘‘too big to fail’’ with equal weight, the systemically important regions are Jiangsu, Guangdong, Chongqing, Sichuan
and Anhui.
Further, a comparison between the different network structures of bank–firm credit networks of many countries will
contribute to better studying the mutual interdependency between banks and firms, favoring the understanding and
quantification of systemic risk of the economic and financial system [13]. However, scholars have mainly focus on the
hierarchical clustering of co-financing banks [27,28]. We take a step further by extracting the network of co-financed
financing platforms, which is conducive to evaluating the effect of risk contagion from platforms to bank system. What is
more, we expect this correlation networks based on our approach of credit similarity measure will be applied in prospective
bank–firm system studies. Our analysis based on the new credit similarity measure could be extended to other financial
markets, such as interbank markets.
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